aşağıdaki yazıyı azar azar çevirmeye çalışacağım, bana yardım etmek isteyen kimseler anlayabildikleri kısmı çevirebilirse çok mesud olurum.uzun olduğunu biliyorum, o yüzden başka şansım kalmadı. herkes bir ucundan tutsa diyorum ben çevirdiklerimi ekleyeceğim.However, the cyborg is different in that
aşağıdaki yazıyı azar azar çevirmeye çalışacağım, bana yardım etmek isteyen kimseler anlayabildikleri kısmı çevirebilirse çok mesud olurum.
uzun olduğunu biliyorum, o yüzden başka şansım kalmadı. herkes bir ucundan tutsa diyorum ben çevirdiklerimi ekleyeceğim.
However, the cyborg is different in that it is a hybrid of the "only machine" and human since it is modeled on human abilities and intelligences. It is the machine that replicates us, causing what Katherine Hayles (1999) describes as, "terror and exciting pleasures" (p. 285). This reverberation between pleasure and terror can be easily established if we consider, once again, the seemingly benign medical devices mentioned above. Within a medicalized discourse these prosthetics are seen as necessary, and even kind, in the face of illness. Using them seeks to restore human potential. We have a much different reaction if we consider implanting or attaching such devices to a "healthy" physical body. In the healthy body such prosthetics become the marker of abjection, the non-human. This difference in the value that we assign to such devices is of critical importance for it renders the cyborg body as harmless when its purpose is to restore the semblance of lost humanity, but as monstrous when the body is healthy. This construction of the normal/natural body locates the cyborg as terror and establishes for us the fear we have of the non-human, when the non-human is not delimited by the restrictions that the rest of us operate under. Performance artists such as those that we discuss here use technology to create a cyber body/identity that challenges the stereotypes associated with abjection. This oscillation between terror and pleasure can also be seen in Haraway's work. She writes that the, "cyborg world is about the final imposition of a grid of control on the planet, about the final abstraction embodied in a Star Wars apocalypse waged in the name of defense... From another perspective, a cyborg world might be about lived social and bodily realities in which people are not afraid of the joint kinship with animals and machines, not afraid of permanently partial identities and contradictory standpoints"(1991, p. 154). As Haraway indicates, the myth of the cyborg blurs several of the intermediary boundaries between the human and the non-human. The first of these leakages occurs as we make indistinct the boundaries between human and animal. The second shift takes place when the differentiations between human/animal and machine are considered. The third, which Haraway positions as an outgrowth of the second, consists of the imprecise nature of the boundary between the physical and the non-physical. The blurring of these boundaries allows for Haraway's declaration, "so my cyborg myth is about transgressed boundaries, potent fusions, and dangerous possibilities which progressive people might explore as one part of needed political work" (Haraway, 1991, p. 154). Hayles has noted that Haraway's identification of the figure of the cyborg locates a space in which traditional boundaries between human and machine are blurred and leakages occur in both directions. Haraway's 336 Studies in Art Education Cyborg Pedagogy argument is even more compelling in that she recognizes that, "cyborgs are simultaneously entities and metaphors, living being and narrative constructions" (Hayles, 114). In other words, there is both a materiality, an embodied presence to the myth of the cyborg, and a metaphorical space that is created by the narratives that produce the myth. In this sense, the metaphor of the cyborg creates a conceptual space for performing embodied subjectivity (Haraway, 1991; Hayles, 1999). Performance art enables us to use the cyborg metaphor to create personal narratives of identity as both a strategy of resistance and as a means through which to construct new ideas, images, and myths about ourselves living in a technological world. In doing so, the performance of the self as cyborg represents an overt political act of resistance in the digital age. Unlike Haraway and Hayles, who struggle to define a posthuman politics of resistance, other apocalyptic prophets of the digital age are foretelling the future possibility of downloading human consciousness into a computer. The idea that the mind and therefore identity represent disembodied forms of information discounts the corporeal presence of the body and renders it obsolete. The cyborg myth represents a new paradigm in the history of embodiment. Whereas prevailing Western European ontology defines the body's presence as the awareness of its own corporeal existence, its absence is conceived as the receding of the body, a process of abandonment while being absorbed in the world outside of itself. Merleau-Ponty argues against this mind/body split when he claims that presence and absence are intertwined through enfleshment, a process where the world is perceived in the body as flesh. Allucquere Rosanne Stone (1996) writes that, "the physical/virtual distinction is not a mind/body distinction. The concept of the mind is not part of virtual systems theory, and the virtual component of the socially apprehensible citizen is not a disembodied thinking thing, but rather a different way of conceptualizing a relationship to the human body"(p. 40). For Stone, the body is mediated through discourse from a variety of texts, producing a legible body that is separate from the physical body to which it is attached. However, as she goes on to explain, the legible body is connected to a specific physical body, and this fusion forms the socially apprehensible citizen. This separates the mind and body in very different ways than that typically presented through the Cartesian dualism. Instead of presenting the mind at the expense of the body, we are confronted with the differing legibilities of the mind and the body, but we do not attempt to escape their coexistence in order to produce a comprehensible being. This inversion of the Cartesian dichotomy presents the possibility that inscription and embodiment are also interconnected. If we consider inscription as the world's imposition on the body, then embodiment represents the assimilation of inscription. In defending the functionality of the body under the circumstances of information technology, Hayles Studies in Art Education 337 Charles R. Garoian and Yvonne M. Gaudelius (1999) distinguishes between inscription and embodiment: "Incorporating practices [embodiment] perform the bodily content; inscribing practices correct and modulate the performance" (p. 200). She clearly differentiates between, yet interconnects the body's performance of cultural incorporation and the culture's performance of inscription. She states, "culture not only flows from the [cultural] environment into the body but also emanates from the body into the [cultural] environment. The body produces culture at the same time that culture produces the body" (p. 200). With the body and the culture interconnected in this reflexive loop, the cyborg no longer signifies a disembodied ontology, but embodiment that is in a continual state of liminality, contingency, and ephemerality, what critical theorist Peter Lunenfeld (1999) refers to as an "unfinished" aesthetic (p. 7). Hayles distinction between the performativity of the body and that of the culture enables us to theorize a pedagogy of resistance. As she exposes and examines these differences, she opens a space of possibility where embodiment, although tied to inscription, can determine its own fate, to produce its own cultural identity. Hayles's concept of cybernetic signification serves as a compelling metaphor for a critical pedagogy. Compared with Lacan's concept of a "floating signifier," where identity is contingent upon the presence and absence of the actual body, Hayles characterizes the body's absorption in virtual culture as a "flickering signifier." She argues that, "information technologies... fundamentally alter the relation of signified to signifier. Carrying the instabilities implicit in Lacanian floating signifiers one step further, information technologies create... flickering signifiers, characterized by their tendency toward unexpected metamorphosis, attenuations, and dispersions" (p. 30). The actual body's presence and absence transformed as "pattern and randomness" signify Hayles's concept of the "virtual body." Flickering between the randomness of digital information and its patterning, the body's identity is continually negotiated and re-negotiated, a play of resistance between the disjunctive attributes of cyberspace and the conjunctions that occur as the subject coalesces meaning and interpretation. Hayles's flickering signifier corresponds to Deleuze and Guattari's (1987) random ontological system of the rhizome and its patterning as nomadology. A rhizome consists of a reticulated system in which an infinite number of connections are possible. Unlike binary systems that are limited to dualistic configurations, those of the rhizome are multicentric. Like an assemblage, it provides multiple lines of flight from one conceptual plateau to another to the point that, "a rhizome or multiplicity never allows itself to be overcoded" (p. 9). Another characteristic of the rhizome is "asignifying rupture," its ability to disconnect in one location within the system, yet reconvene through the other of its multiple routes of connectivity. Thus, the rhizome functions as a mapping system that provides multiple trajectories that are continually drawn and redrawn as its terrain 338 Studies in Art Education Cyborg Pedagogy is being negotiated. Movement through these trajectories constitutes nomadology, a process whereby the multicentric system of the rhizome yields an ephemeral pattern, one that must be continually renegotiated. "With the nomad... it is deterritorialization that constitutes the relation to the earth, to such a degree that the nomad reterritorializes on deterritorialization itself' (Deleuze & Guattari, p. 381). Like the nomad, the cyborg travels through multiple metaphorical spaces as it negotiates meaning between embodied and inscribed subjectivities. As noted earlier, these metaphorical spaces encourage movements of transgression across fluid boundaries within which performance artists can find the potential to enact the cyborg as an art of political resistance.
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raavann (31.03.15)
bunun yerine bölüm bölüm yazarsan buraya illa ki yardım eden çıkacaktır. ben tamamını çevrecek bir kara murat tanımıyorum.
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himmet dayi
(31.03.15)
himmet dayi
merhabalar, ya kağıda çevirdiğim için çevirdiklerimi buraya yazmadım. ben aslında okuyucular bir göz geçirse anladıkları yeri alıntılayıp çevirse kardır diye düşündüm. hepsini çevirmelerini istemiyorum tabi mümkün mü öyle bir şey :)
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🌸raavann
(31.03.15)
However, the cyborg is different in that it is a hybrid of the "only machine" and human since it is modeled on human abilities and intelligences. It is the machine that replicates us, causing what Katherine Hayles (1999) describes as, "terror and exciting pleasures" (p. 285). This reverberation between pleasure and terror can be easily established if we consider, once again, the seemingly benign medical devices mentioned above. Within a medicalized discourse these prosthetics are seen as necessary, and even kind, in the face of illness. Using them seeks to restore human potential. We have a much different reaction if we consider implanting or attaching such devices to a "healthy" physical body.
Bununla birlikte cyborg, insan yetenekleri ve zekasını örnek alan bir makine - insan karışımı olması yönüyle farklılık gösterir. Bizi replika eden (kopyalayan, tekrar eden) bu makine Katherine Hayles'in tanımıyla "dehşet ve heyecan verici zevklere" sebep olur. Zevk ve dehşet arasındaki bu yansıma, aşağıda bahsedilen, görünürde tehlikesiz tıbbi cihazları tekrar göz önünde bulundurursak, rahatlıkla kurulabilir. tıbbi bir söylem ile bu protezler, hastalık karşısında gerekli, hatta faydalı görülmektedir. Onları kullankak insan potansiyelini kurtarmayı amaçlar. Bu gibi cihazları sağlıklı bir vücuda nakletmeyi ya da bağlamayı düşündüğümüzde bilerin çok daha farklı tepkileri var.
buraya yazılanların hakları Sir Anthony Hopkins'e aittir.
yazan eden compumaster, ilgilenen eden fader
modere edenler
basond, compumaster, fraise, kibritsuyu, rakicandir
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